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IN TEE SOPREME COORT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JAVID M.

S'I'ACFFER and CONNIE A.

S7AUFFER,

Plaintiffs and Appellants
and Cross Respondents,

BRIEF FOR PETITION
ON REHEARING

vs.
Case No. 15468
RUSSELL CALL and VELMA CALL and
SUNSET CANYON CORPORATION,

Defendants and Respondents
and Cross Appellants.

BRIEF FOR PETITIONERS
NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants filed their complaint seeking specific perfurrnance of a Uniform Real Estate Contract.

Alleging respondents'

and petitioners' maliciousness in refusing to execute deeds purruant to that contract and irreconcilable differences between the
parties, appellants a 1 so sought an egui table partition of properties
~tween the parties.

Prior to trial, appellants also sought, in

the alternative, compensation for improvements made on portions of
the property.

This c 1 aim was 1 a ter withdrawn.

Respondents answered, denying any malice or ill-intent
toward the plaintiffs, and affirmatively alleging that they had
diligently attefl'lpted to complete the negotiations contemplated by
the contract.

Respondents further asserted that the contract, as

written~ as contemplated by the parties, violated the Statute
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of Frauds, and that parol evidence was not competent t 0
defect.

Lastly, respondents counterclaimed for rnesne r

cure.

ents :·

those general areas to which access had been sp ora a·ically der
them by appellants.
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT
Appellants filed their action in March of 1973. !?.
By August, 1973, six depositions had been taken,

includingo~;

from each of the four parties to the initial contract.

(R. 2;:

et.seq.-295)
In April, 1976, respondents, petitioners herein, mc.
for a partial summary judgment.

( R. 75)

This matter was cal:e: 1

for hearing on April 15, 1976; the depositions were publishec,
the testimony of the appellants'

surveyor was taken.

T~t~

script appears in the record as the Reporter's Transcript, is
twenty-three pages long, and ends as follows:
THE COURT:
Alright, thank you, gentlemen,
and the matter is submitted, subiect only to your
filing memoranca and the Court will rule on it.
MR. BISHOP:

Thank you.

MR. HUGHES:

Thank you.

(R.296 at 22)

Subsequently, memoranda, as requested, were submit'.::!
the respective parties, with appellants filing affidavits in
opposition to the motion.

(R.77-98; 107-141; and 162-183) '.:'
, I

early October, 1976, Judge Burns overruled and denied responc;
motion for summary judgment, setting the matter for pretrial::
November 11, 1976.

(R.185-186;190)

The case was subsequently tried to the cou!_!: on May
eleventh and twelfth, 1977.

.
1 tr'
The dis~rict judge viewed al
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--exhibits ar:d observed the demeanor and judged the credibility of
witnesses.

~espite

sixty-three objections to the introduction of

testimony, the :::::ourt took evidence and heard everythina the parties
said and did proferred by plaintiffs-appellants to prove their
contract.

w

(See Appendix)

'I'hough respondents objected nine times

several areas of examination on the basis of the parol evidence

rule or the Statute of Frauds, each time respondents' objections
were overru 1 ed.

(Id.)

The only testimony not received was that

proferred to show improvements, this due to the fact that plaintiffsappellants had withdrawn their claim for compensation for improve~nts
~ow

and they conceded that the improvements were not offered to
or delineate the so-called boundaries of the parcels allegedly

purchased.

( T. 12 2: 15-12 3: 7)

Furthermore, many of the improvements

concededly were made after the lawsuit had been filed.

So exhaus-

tive was the trial court's inquiry that midway through trial, on
recross by respondents' -petitioners' counsel, Mr. Bishop, counsel
for plaintiffs-appellants, objected to further testimony on one
alleged boundary as cumulative, indicating:
MR. BISHOP:
Objection, your Honor, that is
we have been over this four or five times.
(T. 162:4-5)
Ultimately, the trial transcript comprises 294 pages.
After plenary trial, the district judge exercised his exclusive
province.!/ to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses and found
the Uniform Real Estate Contract unenforceable.

Specifically, the

hial court noted that the document presented to the court failed
t0

2/
describe with particularity any tract of land.-

The parol

~stimony of the parties was contradictory, and the exhibits
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preferred and received by the court did nothing to clarify t:.'
ambiguity.

Plaintiffs'-appellants' main exhibit, Exhibit

2

shows that there are no walls and wire fences or

''
an Y boundar:'

around the two homes which enclose any acreage.

Appe 11 ants

F

asserted that one parcel, bounded only on two sides by a fenc,

-

and designated by them as containing 18. 3 acres, was the fort·:
parcel to be retained by respondents-petitioners pursuant to~·
document drafted January 2, 1969.

Further, plaintiffs'-appe::

proposed boundaries for the home parcels rarely followed fenc'
walls at all, al though a few straight and sporadically intern:
fences are depicted nearby.

Lastly, a large fence,

locatedc~

southern portion of the exhibit was not even located

00 t~

property in question!
The trial court also found that all the parties exec,
the January 2nd document with the expectation that boundaries
would be agreed upon, and that appellants moved onto the pror
knowing these matters were unsettled.

The court further founc

that the respondents made several trips to Utah to settle the
boundaries, but that there had never been a meeting of the mk
of the parties as to the nature or extent of the boundaries'
location.l/
Lastly, the court noted that appellants had volur.tar
withdrawn that portion of the complaint alleging respondents
"unlawful, wrongful, and malicious refusal to per f orm

" accord:·

4I
to the written document.-

t held, i

All the parties, the cour
5I

h trial cc
And, while t e
, poracic
found that respondents had knowledge of appellants 5

come be fore the court in good faith. -
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cccupation of the premises, it did not find respondents had consented to the same.

There is ample evidence in the record to

support that distinction.
RECORD ON APPEAL
Pursuant to Rule 75, URCP, appellants designated the
Record on Appeal on October 2 4, 19 77.

(R.287)

Simultaneously,

they filed their certificate that a transcript had been ordered.
(R.288)

The district court clerk then transmitted to the Supreme

court the following nine volumes:

Two volumes of court records,

all six depositions taken prior to the overruled riotion for summary judgment, and the Reporter's Transcript of the summary
~udgment

proceedings.

These were all filed in the Clerk's Office

in Salt Lake City on November 22, 1977.
In December, 1977, Willard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for
appellants, checked out these nine volumes and had them transmitted to Cedar City, Utah, sor.ie 280 miles from the Court.
Subsequent thereto,

two more volumes were filed in Salt Lake City

as supplemental to the record on appeal:

(1) An Order executed by

Judge Burns extending the time for filing the transcript of trial,
docketed on December 19, 1977; and (2) The transcript of trial,
docketed January 27, 1978.
Mr. Christiansen, Judge Burns' court reporter, provided
both counsel with copies of that trial transcript, so neither
counsel checked it out from the Supreme Court Clerk.

By pre-

arrangement between counsel, the nine volumes were transferred
horn Cedar City to st. George for use incident to the preparation
of respondents'

brief.

Subsequently, by stipulation, the exhibits
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were forwarded to the Supreme Court.

The nine vol UMes compr:

the original record on appeal were not returned until J

u1y, ::

This case was set fer argument on October 10,

1971

.

Justice Ellett, subsequent thereto, checked out only nine of·
eleven volumes of the designated record on appeal.

Apparentl;

the last two volumes were never removed from the Clerk's Offk
The Supreme Court Opinion was filed on January 91

:i·

Pursuant to Rules 76(e) and (f) of URCP, petitioners' counsel,
the basis of concurrent obligations, received an extension tc ·'
this brief on or before February 13, 1979.
DISPOSITION ON APPEAL
The Supreme Court, apparently due to the inadvertent
shevelment of the designated record on appeal, seemingly viewe:I
cc:i.se without the benefit of the supplemental record, includinc1
. 1 transcript..
6/
tria

The first paragraph of the Opinion, sirnL

others therein, confuses the parties and states that appellant'
respondents, were to retain approximately forty acres of farni"
Furthermore, the payments recited as made in that paragraph
incorrect.

al'

These misstatements, however, are probably insign;',
0 f more significance is the body of the Opinion whic:

never clearly delineates the standards of review applicable tc
judgments after trial.

Noting the on-going disagreement of&

parties, the Opinion only briefly alludes to the trial cour t"·
having taken parol evidence with regard to the language

of the

.
.
d t of the
contract and the subsequent communication and con uc
.
. . 1
t1'ce of an
parties. Thereafter, the Opinion takes JUd1c1a no
h state or
increase of land values in the southern region of t e
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to hypothesize that respondents could stand idly by, bargaining in
bad faith and hoping for a "mighty windfall."

The Opinion fails

to note that the trial court explicitly rejected that hypothesis
-F.

7I

d.

and made a contrary _in ing. -

Having once fixed the position of the parties within this
12Ypothesis, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery, part
performance, that was never pled,
~raised

on appeal.

~

tried by consent, and

Part performance, the Opinion reasoned,

takes "the matter" out of the Statute of Frauds, and is dispositive
of the case.
Ultimately, the thrust of the reversal assumes the
existence of sufficient fences and stone walls never shown at
trial by which the descriptive boundaries are to be located and
instructs the trial court to al low appellants their day in court
and take the testimony of what was said and done - something the
ttial court had already exhaustively accomplished.

Thereafter,

the Opinion instructs the trier of fact to decide the legal
~~ription

of the land purchased and order the same conveyed to

appellants - this, despite the trial court's express finding that
~ough the parties all contemplated an agreement on the boundaries,

"no subsequent agreement, oral or otherwise, was ever reached that
resolved the ambiguities.

11

.!!/

It clearly appears that Justice Ellett felt that the
trial court had ruled on the basis of the summary judgment transcript and the other volumes of the record he viewed.

The Opinion's

~rnana, according to one recent decision,

in fact postures the

parties as if there had never been a trial

.J..I
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REHEARING
Petitioners, on rehearing, request that the Suprene
Court re-examine the entire designated record on appeal.

~t

tioners request that the Supreme Court scrutinize the ~~~~
nature and thrust of the judicial notice taken, and the prop::.
of taking the same without notice to petitioners.

Petitioner:

request that the Supreme Court re-examine the standard of rer:
mistakenly applied to evaluate this case.

Petitioners

that the Supreme Court evaluate the doctrine of part

reque~:

~rfum~

which, as a prerequisite to its invocation, requires a comple:
contract and meeting of the minds, in light of the trial cour:
findings that no such event ever took place.

Petitioners rec:'

the Supreme Court to review its position as advocate in not c:.
proposing

~

sponte part performance as a theory of recovery,

but, without notice or any argument thereon, finding it dispc:
tive of the case.

Petitioners request that the Supreme Coort

examine the logic of an opinion which hypothesizes the potent::
for bad faith, and then rules as if the case before it fit
hypothesis.

tt,1

Lastly, petitioners request that the SupremeCou::

examine the testimony of the witnesses and the exhibits which
clearly display the paucity of fences, walls, or other natura:
boundaries to demarcate the alleged boundaries of appellants'
purchases.
Ultimately, petitioners seek reversal of the Opinic:
which apparently allows the district judge to ~ for the
·
·
1 y f oun d non-exi· stent, and then
parties
a contract, previous
10/
judicially enforce that contract as created.~
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
rt is perhaps repetitious to state facts supplemental to
those found and entered by the trial court in petitioners'

favor.

Nonetheless, an overview of the facts may effectively serve to
hlghlight the testimony forming the basis for the lower court's
findings, insofar as the Opinion seemingly ignores them.
In 1959 the petitioners, Russell and Velma Call, purchased approximately 400 acres of property in Washington County in
an area generaly known as Anderson Junction.
~~based

The farm they

was bisected by old U.S. Highway 91 and on each side of

the highway was located one house, the larger to the east constructed of rock, and the smaller to the west constructed of
~ick.

The surrounding area has an occasional rock wall and some

sporadic fences.

As indicated by Exhibits D-·2 and D-3, much of

the land had been used for farming, with some having been set
aside for orchards.DI

Irrigation water for all the land was

supplied primarily from a single well.
Though this purchase was consummated in 1959, the Calls
never moved to the 1 and, nor have they ever 1 i ved on it.
In 1968 the plaintiffs-appellants visited the Anderson
Junction area while vacationing in Utah.

Basically they obtained

nothing more than an idea of the general lay of the land.

Mr.

Stauffer came once again at Christl!las of 1968, but again only got
a general idea of the lay of the land.

fT.20:11-14)

On his last

trip, however, Mr. Stauff~r, a real estate agent with an inactive
license, obtained some blank Uniform Real Estate Contracts antecederit to a meeting with the Cal ls at the latter's residence on
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January 2, 1969, in Santa Maria, California, aporoxfoat
•

miles from the subject property.

·

e 1y ]1j1

(T.17:6-12; 75:29-76:1!; ll.

23:4)
On January 2, 1969, the parties basically sat aroun'
1 arge table with Mr. Stauffer and Mr. Ca 11 the primary partic
pants in the preparation of the document executed that

d~.

(T.64:14-69; 139:11-14; 140:24-141:15; 232:20-21)
The completed contract appears as plaintiffs' Exhik
17.

The conveyancing clause of the contract states as follo•.:
Witnesseth:
that the seller for the consideration hereb
mentioned agrees to sell and convey to the buyer, and tf.e
buyer for the consideration herein mentioned agrees to
purchase the following described real property, situate
in the County of Washington, State of Utah, to-wit:
Andersons' Junction, more particulary described as folio«
see enclosed legal description.* Stauffers to purchase
two houses using the natural boundaries which is approxi·
mately ten ( 10) acres collectively plus approximately l/'
water rights.
Calls to retain the fenced natural farm
ground on the SE South side from interstate freeway
(which is approximately forty acres) plus 2/5 water righ:
The remaining ground SE of the old highway to be STAUFFEL
along with the two houses.
STAUFFERS to purchase 1/2 of
all remaining property to be owned as tenants in ~~M
with CALLS.
The above description was based on an initial assuif)

that U.S. Highway 91 ran east and west, insofar as itwentfr:
California to Utah.

(":'.236:6-14)

All of the parties thattes:

fied, particularly Mr. Stauffer, the real estate agent, undeii'.'
that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased by the stac'

* Attached to the Uniform Real Estate Contract is a ~wo page
document entitled "Legal Description" setting ~orth eight the:
specifically described and surveyable parcel or land, todescr:
with water rights.
At trial, plaintiffs conceded these b~tc:
tions did net define the property they were purchasi~,
the sum total of all the Calls' property.
(T.65:7-14)
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were undetermined,
(T. 6S:7-14;

important, and subject to future negotiation.

80:30-81:23; 82:27-29)
~,

the document,

The use of infinitives within

STAUFFERS to purchase and Calls to sell and

convev and to retain,

further evinces the precatory intent of the

-~

~rties.

Mrs. Stauffer also clearly understood and testified at

trial that the boundaries of the parcels to be purchased were
still subject to negotiation.

In reference to the January 2

meeting, she stated as follows:
we agreed to agree, because we were trying to get along.
( T . 1 7 0 : 14 -15 ; see al so T . 1 7 0 : 1- 3 0 )
On January 2, the Calls also understood that they would
have to come to Utah and meet with the Stauffers to work out the
boundaries.

(T.244:15-22; 266:10; see also Finding of Fact No. 5)

Inwfar as Mr. Stauffer was presently teaching school rather than
elling real estate, the parties tentatively agreed to meet during
Easter of 1969 to work out the boundaries.
and 266: 17-21)
t~

(T.66:30; 244:8-26;

It cannot be gainsaid that as the boundaries of

property circumscribing the homes and the 40 acres to be

retained in fee by the Cal 1 s remained uncertain, the balance of
the property description implicitly remained egually nebulous.
On February 12, 1969, appellants wrote the Calls
indicating only that they were planning on visiting Anderson
Junction to go into the homes and do "a lot of looking around".
ID-13)

At the trial, Mr. Stauffer testified that by D-13 he

notified Mr. Cal 1 of the Stauffers' plans on moving furniture
ar.d starti;-,g renovation of the homo=s, preparatory to his wife's
occupation of the same.

(T.85:2-14)

The letter also reguested

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-11-

that the Calls execute a notice attached thereto indic t'

a ing

a sale had been consummated.

~·

Mr. Cal 1 never signed that noti:

Though Mr. Call did not expect the Stauffers ~~~
onto the property until the boundaries were settled, he disco,•
during Easter of 1969 that Mrs. Stauffer had already taken po;
sion of the small home.

(T.266:4-14; T.39:19)

Attempted neg:·

tiations to determine the boundaries at this time were fruitle
and Mr. Call returned to California, as did Mr. Stauffer to f:·J
teaching school.

At trial, though it was stipulated that Sta:',

made several improvements on the land, their attorney

also~

that the improvements did nothing to aid in the determinatior,.
boundaries.

(T.122:15-123:33; see also T.190:9-192:20)

bo~ ~t

subsequent possession by Mrs. Stauffer was sporadic,
terms of time and in area occupied.

The

of~

An early affidavit

Stauffer indicated that from August 1971 to January 1973 she
resided in California with her husband.
Stauffer testified similarly.

(R.24,'][4)

(T.217:28-218:3)

At triaP:

On the dayo:

trial, in 1977, Mr. Stauffer still resided in California ands~
taught school there.

(T.16:26-28)

Pursuant to the document executed on January 2, IW
payments were tendered and received through September of !97l.
(T.41:6-14)

To negotiate the boundaries, Mr. Call came toAni'

son Junction six times, spending twenty-one days away
1969 alone.

f om wor''

r

Mr. Stauffer testified on cross that Russell call

came up to the property two to three times a year, mainly to
settle the boundaries.

(T.245:17-20; 85:28-87:6)
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At trial O

ar1

~stified that all of the money he had received had been expended

in making such trips.

(T.266:25-28)

Though negotiations continued, no agreement was reached
on the boundaries in 1969, or in later years.
T.250: 23-29; and 252: 2-11)

(T.250:15-20;

The trial court specifically found

that al though discussions tock place, no agreement was ever
12/
reached.Sometime in late 1972 or early 1973, Mrs. Stauffer
re~rned

to Anderson Junction.

Despite the fact that the contract

purportedly transferred only approximately l/5th of the Junction's
water rights, she filed documents with the State Engineer's
office claiming all of the water.

(T.150-151)

With her hands

already soiled by this deception, Mrs. Stauffer subsequently contacted an attorney who forwarded several deeds to the Calls,
requesting their execution of the same.
~Complaint

at R.17)

(See Exhibit C attached

Mr. Call took these deeds to a civil

engineer and, upon seeing what they described, refused to execute
them.

Thereafter a survey map "commissioned by and prepared for

the Stauffers" was mailed to the Calls, with a second demand that
the Calls execute deeds upon the threat of litigation.

(R.17-18)

At trial Mrs. Stauffer testified that her survey as
~atted followed little piles of rocks placed on the property in

1972 by her and Mr. Cal 1 in an excursion over two hours long.

(T.106:21-ll.Z..!.l; 132:12-13; 133:2-134:3)
th

Unable to explain

.
e inconsistency between this story and her prior statements

under oath, on cress examination, she admitted that some of the
boundaries were set arbitrarily by her surveyor.

(T.112:7-9;
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135:22-136:5; and 158:19-27)

Mr. Gale Day,

~

surveyor, was never called at trial to corroborate h
Conversly, Mr. Call categorically and emphatically d
field trip.

er story
.

en1ed sue·

( T. 252: 20-27; 252: 28-253: 5; and 253: 30-2S4:G) '.

trial court specifically rejected Mrs. Stauffer's story When:
found that no agreement was ever reached resolving the
land descriptions.

ambig~.

Finding No. 7.

The principal problem with the Stauffer survey is t
it unilaterally supplies descriptions neither amicably settk
contained in the Uniform Real Estate Contract of 1969, in vio
of the parol evidence rule.11/

Furthermore, as platted, the

survey expresses little more than the Stauffers' self-interest
and a very real proclivity of Mrs. Stauffer for overreaching.
but one example, both Stauffers maintained throughout trial

t:

the 40 acres of farmland to be retained by Calls consisted o'.
parcel platted by their surveyor as containing only 18.30 am
(T.83:19-23; 98:11-16; see D-2*)
Examination of the Stauffer survey reflects the part
discovery during Easter of 1969 that there are no fences or

na:•

boundaries which effectively enclose any area as designated irt
document of January 2 , 19 6 9 .

Further, whi 1 e the Opinion indic:·

that natural boundaries consisted of stone walls and wire fen:
examination of this survey, coupled with the Stauffers' testir
reveals that few of the boundaries on the parcels as platted
for,,:
Around the smal 1 house,
·
followed any such demarcation.

~1·'

* Note that D-2 and P-18 both depict the Stauffer surveY, 1::
for different markings put on them during the course of tr'·
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a

00 t

A

On e of the boundaries of parcel 1 follows a fence or wall

•

;iarcel adJacent to the small house (parcel 2) has only c·ne

~undary

co-extensive with a fence or wall, and in that instance

fails to follow the same when such wall curved to the sout!'least.
Mr. Stauffer recognized these problems and further clarified +:hat
~ny

parts of the boundaries had never been discussed.

(T.73:9-

28 I

The land around the large house (parcel 3, as designated
~the

Stauffers) was also arbitrarily designated.

its boundaries follows a fence,

located by the surveyor.

While one of

the other three were arbitrarily

(T.82:4-15)

A lengthy fence shown to

the south of both D-2 and P-18 was located on property owned by
Owen Cottam.
At trial Mrs. Stauffer was cros3 examined relative to P94, an illustration she prepared representing her pictorial

understanding of the boundaries in 1971.
~r

The differences between

drawing and the survey prepared for her by Gale Day in 1972

are striking by comparision.

(See P-24; and T.172:22-176:21)

While Parcel No. 4 as reflected on D-2 and P-18 is not
~unded entirely by fences,

those exhibits fail to show another

~nee to the north and east of that parcel, which is depicted on

a survey prepared for the petitioners by Marion Malnar, a licensed
~rveyor.

(D-3)

All of the parties were aware of this fence, and

t~ appellants knew that the property within the same had been

~rmed, perhaps even by Peter Anderson, the original owner.
IT· 9 2: 18- 2 8 ; 9 3- 9 5 ;

9 7 : 6 ; 9 8 : 2 9-9 9 : 7; 13 3 : 2 6-13 4 : 6; and 16 7 : 19- 3 0 )

?hcugh the outer fence took in some B.L.M. ground, the appellants
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...,
could never accept Calls' position that it was this fence

th·

··<

enclosed the 40 acres of farmland he wished to retain.

No ta(
using a ridge to the east of old U. S. Highway 91 as one boun:.

the same having been used by appellants in their designat·

ion:

parcel 4, the area designated by Cal 1, less approximately

5

ai

would have comprised approximately 42.93 acres.
The survey prepared by Mr. Mal nor, nonetheless, is.
as objectionable as the survey prepared by Gale Day.

As draf:

it reflects nothing more than a surveyor's interpretation of:
possible description under the terms of the contract.

At trL

petitioners preferred that Marien Malnor would testify that;,
familiar with the land, it was, nonetheless, impossible forh:·

1

survey anything on the basis of P-17, the Uni form Real Estate
Contract dated January 2, 1969.

It was further preferred that

Malnar would testify that both surveyors' descriptions were
possibilities under the document and neither could be said to:
more accurate than the other.

Understanding the thrust ofili

testimony, appellants waived their right of cross examination
the proffer was accepted.

(T.276:30-278:2)

As neither party would accept the other's designatic:
boundaries, litigation ensued.

1

During the litigation Mr. and':

Call, who could ill-afford the travel and expense, guit-clai~e:
h. c1
whatever interest they had to Sunset Canyon Corporation, WI·

solely owned by Dexter Snow of St. George.
tion took the property subject to Whatever

Sunset Canyon Cor;:·
1.

nterest the plaint:I

had purchased and not in derogation of their title.

( T. 267:11·

Negotiations continued, but broke down after t he first pretri;
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Triai tooK place on May 11 and 12, 1977.

197:: .

The testimony

therein or.ly accentuated the ambiguity of the January 2,
pro.•erred
·
1969 , document and !71ade patently obvious the disagreement between
the parties.

This, the court so found.

BASIS FOR PETITION
POINT I
THE OPINION VIOLATES RULE 12 OF THE UTAH RUL~S
OF EVIDENCE AND ARTICLE I, SECTION 7, OF ':'HE
CONS':'ITUTION OF UTAH IN TAKING JUDICIAL NOTICE
OF A MATTER NOT THERETOFORE SO NOTICED IN THE
ACTION WITHOUT AFFORDING TEE RESPONDENTS A
REASONABLE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT INFORMATION
RELEVANT TO THE PROPRIETY OF TAKING SUCH JUDICIAL NOTICE AND TO THE TENOR OF THE MATTER SO
NOTICED.
A.

The Due Process Safeguards
The Utah Rules of Evidence were adopted by the Supreme

Court to be effective July 1, 1971, pursuant to the rule-making
power entrusted to the Court by Section 78-2-4 of the Otah Code.
~le

12(4) of those Rules specifically refers to those standards

of due process afforded all parties prior to a reviewing court's
taking judicial notice.

In particular, that Rule states as

follows:

A judge or reviewing court taking judicial notice under
paragraph (1) or (3) of this rule of matter not theretofore
so noticed in the action shall afford the parties reasonable
opportunity to present information relevant to the propriety
of taking such judicial notice and to the tenor of the matter
to be noticed.
(Id., emphasis added)
The salutary purpose of the above Rule becomes clearly
evident from this case.

Embodying those standards of due process

of Liw affordable to litigants under Article I, Section 7 of the
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Utah Constitution, the Rule essentially precludes appella~
advocacy affecting vested rights without the opportunity for
interested parties to be adequately heard.
In the instant case, the Opinion's autho r, sans any
hearing, took judicial notice as follows:
This Co':1rt takes ju~icial knowledge of the fact tha:
land values in the area increased greatly since the cont••
was made.
By refusing to agree on the exact description':
t~e land sold and in which plaintif~s were placed in pos;.
sion, the seller could hope for a mighty windfall ~~I
it at its enchanced value to others.
·
The phrase in Rule 12, "the tenor of the matter to be noticec'
particularly applicable to the above paragraph of the Court's
Opinion.
Edition,

Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabrida•
(1976) defines "tenor" as follows:l.!/

( 1) General course or strain; general direction; mode or
continuance; (2) general character or nature; (3) that
course of thought which holds on or runs through the who::
a discourse; general course; drift or direction of thougn·.
purport; sustance.

In the above instance, the notice taken serves only:
introduce a tainted theoretical situation, Justice

Ellett,~

sponte postulating petitioners' possible refusal to bargain ii
good faith.

Beyond re-posturing the previously innocuous equ:·

table position of the parties, the Opinion's judicial notice
surprisingly assumed a hypothetical situation contrary to an
express finding of the trial court, which states:

The Court finds that there was a justifiable dispute ads t'..
e'
the existence of the boundaries, that payr.ien t s we re ma
d de'r
kept under the contract, and that both plaint~ffs a~ fai;'.
ants asserted their claims before this court in goo
(Finding No. 13, R.261)
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B.

'1.'he Thrust of Actual Bad Faith or Fraud

In State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323, 234 P.2d 600 (1951),
an opinion drafted by Justice Crockett held that the value of personalty about which no evidence had been proferred could not be
•udicially assumed in reaching a legal conclusion.

Nonetheless,

in Flick v. VanTassell, 547 P.2d 204 (Utah 1976), this Court indicated it might, on rare occasions, examine things outside the
record if an obvious injustice or fraud would ot:herwise occur.
See also Paetross v. Board of Commissioners, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah
1976) •

The applicability of actual bad faith to real estate
contracts otherwise uncertain has long been recognized by the Utah
Supreme Court.

In Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915)

the Supreme Court in the body of its discussion quoted Roberts on
Frauds, §135, as follows:
To call anything a part performance, before the existence of
the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be part
performance is established, is an anticipation of proof by
assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over it,
for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium of
proof.
Thereafter, however, the Adams Court intimates that the foregoing
statement of law may not be hard and fast under peculiar circumstances.

146 P. at 466.

Further, that the Statute of Frauds will

not be employed to shield a fraud is an oft-quoted maxim in the

law.

Courts unerringly, however,

fail to postulate whether bad

~ 1 th would breathe certainty into a description otherwise uncertain, or rather simply give rise to an action at law for damages.
Regardless, while factual circumstances of bad faith might excuse
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some extrajudicial examination with notice to the part·
.
ies, JU'..
speculation on bad faith or possible fraud, even when

..
·
1 nvitec

·

the litigants, has been sagaciously rejected by this Court.
Pioneer Finance

&

Thrift Co. v. Powell, 21 Utah 2d 201, 443

P

389 (1968).

C.

The Indefensible Use of "What If" In the DecisionMakina Process
As indicated by Justice Wilkins in dissent, "[t]he

suggestion in the majority opinion that the sellers refused t:
agree in bad faith and in hope of windfall profit is
justified by the evidence. "

simply,~.

Further, that suggest ion is expre;

contrary to the trial court's finding, which is amply supporte:
the record.

Such judicial notice as taken here seemingly ser::

but one purpose and that is to place the parties before the Cc:
in a hypothetical situation as if bad faith had occurred and t'.'
to rule by so positioning the parties.

E. Wayne Thode, pro:e:'

of law, has indicated that the use of a hypothetical case to
·
·
f act is
·
· d e f ensi·bl e .lS/
cause in
in
d eterrnine

~h e th rus t

·1·

O-f

Prr'1
,,

Thode' s criticisms in the area of tort law is no less applica::
here;

judicial inquiry is not illuminated by postulating what

might have happened under other circumstances and then rul~
as if those circumstances had occurred.
It should be further noted that the Opinion, while
taking judicial notice of present land values, fails to take
notice of what those values were in 1969.

It is equally plaus:

that Mr. Stauffer, havi.ng recently been to Utah prior to Janua:
2, 1969, and having held a real estate license, had peculiar
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.n
k owledge enabling him to construct a bargain unconscionably
~vorable

to himself.

The comparison of land values, however,

never came up at trial because the issue of bad faith was never
appropriately presented to the court, the facts clearly showing
that petitioners came to the court with clean hands and in good
faith.

D.

See Finding No. 13, R.261.
The Duty of the Appellate Tribunal
The Opinion's taking of judicial notice without affording

the petitioners an opportunity to be heard cannot be passed off as
harmless error.

The thrust of that notice colors the entire

Opinion; to reach the same result, but delete the offensive paragraph on rehearing, would do both this Court and the parties litigant a gross injustice.

Justice Benjamin Cardozo, speaking for

the Supreme Court of the United States, and construing provisior,s
similar to the due process clauses of the Utah Constitution,
indicated that the necessity of a hearing prior to an appellate
court's taking judicial notice is one of the "rudiments of fair
play assured to every litigant."

Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public

Utilities Commission, 301 U.S. 292 at 304-305 (1937).

Ohio Bell

subsequently formed the basis of the advisory comments applicable
to Rule 20l(e) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which closely
parallels Rule 12(4) U.R.E. applicable in this jurisdiction.
Again, the pejorative nature of the judicial notice
taken on appeal cannot be ignored.

The indication that the sellers

~~_liy~J:~in3~~.£ a windfall assumes an underlying scheme

directly contrary to the record and the express findings entered
by the trial court.

A careful reading of the Opinion reveals that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-21-

to its advocate-author, the hypothetical case became th

~

a. Pos::
in which the parties were fixed and affected the ultirnat ..
· e ais;:

tion of the case.

No notice regarding the nature and ten

or

those matters judicially noted was ever tendered to peti·t 1·

.

O'.

oner,

their counsel.
In summation, the Utah Constitution and accomp~~M
code charge the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
with administering, and creating where necessary, a vast body,
substantive and procedural law by which it creates a tradition
justice in the State of Utah.

The Utah Rules of Evidence adoft

in 1971 prescribe a system of evidentiary rules by

which~

standards were afforded parties litigant to avoid surprise anc
injustice.

Most of these rules prescribe the

standards~~~

the courts control its officers in their efforts to afford the::
clients a day in court and empower the judiciary to limit, !arr'
based on a long and developing tradition of common law, the

in~

duction of evidence that might be false, unsubstantiated, withe
foundation or only marginally relevant.

A few,

among them Ru!:

12, exemplify those very notions of "notice" and "an opportuni'.
to be heard" by which the very meaning of justice is both manci:
and measured.

Should the Utah Supreme Court, at this juncture,

there fore, choose to ignore or otherwise bypass the thrust oft
Rule, then the essence of the same, though embraced with words,
will be emaciated by action.

Sil!lply stated, the Opinion's juci·

notice, and the tenor or fair import to be derived thereof, un·
. ent in whic:
fairly characterized l!lY clients and created an amb].

,,,n in fact t'.'
the Opinion ruled as if something had occurre d Wh Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial court found it had not.
~r

As an officer of the Court, I ask

a rehearing of this entire case, or, in the alternative, an

opportunity to be heard, pursuant to Rule 12, pertaining to the
nature and tenor of the judicial notice which colored this Opinion.
POINT I I
THE SUPREME COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD
OF REVIEW TO THIS CASE ON APPEAL DUE TO THE
INADVERTANT DISHEVELMENT OF' THE DESIGNATED
RECORD ON APPEAL.
As stated earlier in this brief, two volumes of the
designated record on appeal were never removed from the Clerk's
office.

One of those two volumes was most likely the trial tran-

£ript supplementally filed in January of 1978.

The Court's

discussion of the evidence below can be extracted largely by
refurence to the briefs and the other nine volumes initially filed
with the Court.
~~llants

The Opinion's thrust, however, was to afford the

their day in court, something that had already occurred.

It is inconsistent that Justice Ellett would knowingly only partially review the record; and procedurally he would not require
a case to be re-opened had he known all the evidence was in.
A further comparison of the standards of appellate review will
reveal that Justice Ellett inadvertently felt that on the record
before him, this case had been submitted after summary judgment.
A.

Appeals After Plenary Trial
First, petitioners recognize that in equity,

pursu~nt

Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution, the Supreme
Court may review both the facts and the law.

Nonetheless, on

appeal after trial, the court wil 1 generally de fer to the trial
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to

court's findings.

BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 1559 3 .
fit:
October 24, 1978; Foster v. Blake Heights Corporation, 530 p·
I

815 (Utah 1974).

This standard has been variously phras~ ~

drawing all inferences from the evidence in a light favorable·
the findings to simply assuming the trial court believed that
portion of the evidence which supported its findings and susti
ing the lower court's judgment, if possible, on any legal grou
applicable from the record.
Secondly, trial courts are allowed exclusivity in r::
on the credibility of witnesses.

Child v. Child, 8 Otah

2d~

332 P.2d 981 (1958); DeVas v. Noble, 13 Utah 2d 133, 369 P.2d.
(1962).

Furthermore, as appellants waived cross-examinatioo

regarding respondents'

surveyor's preferred testimony that nei:

parties' survey, which surveys were radically different, coulc
said to better describe the property contained in the document
drafted January 2, 1969, the lower court's findings in accorda:
with that testimony are unassailable on appeal.

Russell M.W

Co. v. Givan, 7 Utah 2d 380, 325 P.2d 908 (1958).
Matters beyond the record are not considered, nor ar:
theories not presented below and raised for the first time on
appeal.

See Point IV, infra; Grover v. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 44J,I.

P.2d 598 (1970).
B.

Appeals From Summary Judgment
In contrast to the above, in appeals from sumrnary]ui

ments, largely based on the salutary principle that parties sr:
· f ences are
not be summarily denied their day in court, all in er
drawn in favor of the losing party.

As succinctly stated in r
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·2c1·s1·on '
earlier c;_

the -pertinent i·nq11i"ry

. . . is whether under any view of the facts the plaintiff
could recover.
It is acknowledged that in the face of a
motion for dismissal on summary judgment, the plaintiff 1 s
encitled to have the trial court, and this court on review,
consider all of the evidence which plaintiff is able to
cresent and every inference and intendament fairly arising
~herefrom in the light mcst favorable to him.
(Abdulkadir
v. western Paciffg 1 Railroad Co., 7 Utah 2d 53, at 57, 318
?.2d 139 (1957).On appeal from summary judgments, any plausible theory,
even if raised for the first time, may be considered if fairly set
forth in the substance of the pleadings and affidavits.
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976).
J~gments

Rich v.

Similarly, to afffirm summary

on appeal, this Court must conclude there is no unresolved

issue of material fact,

the solution of which would be required for

the verdict as rendered and judgment.

National American Life Ins.

Co. v. Bayou Country Club, Inc., 16 Utah 2d 417, 403 P.2d 26
11965).

Alternatively to that requisite finding, the Supreme

Court must remand the matter for trial.

C.

Procedural Posture of the Opinion
An analysis of the Opinion in light of the above is en-

lightening.

While summarily reciting the essence of the trici.l

court's findings,

the Opinion fails to indicate that there was no

evidence to support the same or further delineate where the lower
court erred in taking or re fusing testimony to support contrary
conclusions.

Instead, the Opinion infers the possibility that

Petitioners might have idly refused to agree to a final description of properties in bad faith.

Once having imagined this equity-

shifting inference, the Opinion then proposes a theory of recovery

~rt raised in the pleadings, not presented t0 the lower court by
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consent, nor presented on appeal, part performance.

Ul tirnat;

the Opinion remands the case, instructing the trial court tc
testimony as to what the parties did and said.

This has a:n

occurred, and all litigants rested.
Clearly, Justice Ellett did not, when draftir.g thi:
Opinion, have the trial transcript before him.

Instead her..

that appellants, having been denied their day in court, sho(
afforded the same, and thereafter instructed the lower coun
what legal theory it could grant specific performance.

This·

should not knowingly compound that initial and inadvertent e::
by refusing to rehear this matter.
POINT III
THE SUPREME COURT COMMITTED A MANIFEST ERROR
OF LAW IN APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF PART PERFORMANCE TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE.
A.

The Doctrine of Part Performance does not take
"matters" out of the Statute of Frauds.
Utah has long recognized the doctrine of part per 12:·

mance.

Its application, however, has been used only in ac:cr:.i

with the principle that as a prerequisite to its invocation,:
contract between the parties must first be shown.

For exarnp;:i

Adams v. Manning, 46 Utah 82, 148 P. 465 (1915), the defendar.:
resisting ejectment, produced the following agreement in writ;
October 19, 1907.
Received of H. W. Mannina $30a5 1
payment of 30 acres of land.
Price to be $100 for said
D. C. Adams
The defendant testified at trial that he went into possession
1907, and had used the land consistent with its only purpose,

pasturing of animals.

The trial court accepted Manning' 5 ev:
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and awarded him a. decree of specific performance.

The Utah supreme

court, however, noting that Adams had owned more than 30 acres in
the vicinity, held that plaintiff's contention that the description contained in the memorandum was insufficient "must prevail".
Pertinent to the defendant's reliance on part performance, the
~court

stated as follows:

The first essential, therefore, is to establish that there is
a contract. Since the receipt referred to is utterly insufficient to establish a contract, it must be established by
other competent evidence. Has respondent produced evidence
by which a parol contract of sale is established with the
clearness and precision which is required in courts of equity
where specific performance of parol contracts respecting the
sale of real estate is sought? All the authorities are to
the effect that such contracts must be clearly established,
and we are firmly committed to that doctrine. 148 P. at 466.
The Adams Court then issued the following caveat regarding the admission of parol evidence to establish contracts otherwise
violative of the Statute of Frauds:
[O]nless the courts are very careful in the admission of
parol evidence and in acting upon the mere inherent probability as such appear to the courts, they will, in equity,
enforce parol contracts which are clearly within the statute
as readily as courts of law enforce all other contracts and
will thus entirely fritter away the statute of frauds.
The thrust of Adams clearly is that clear and certain contracts,
not "matters", are taken out of the statute by part per forrnance.
The caveat in the Adams case relative to taking parol testimony to
otherwise establish an uncertain contract has been reduced in
reference to land descriptions to a rule of evidence in the State
of Utah.

In Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026,

11973), this Court sta.ted that rule succinctly as fol lows:

Parol evidence is admissible to apply, not to supply, a
description of lands in the contract. Parol evidence will
not be admitted to complete a defective description, or show
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the in ten ton with which it was made.
Parol evidenc
used for the purpose of identifying the descriptione may
in the writing with its location on the ground, but C~b
the purpose of ascertaining and locating the land abnot:
·
·
d , an d supplying
·
t h e par t ies
negotiate
the descriptio out.h.
which they have omitted from the writing. There is n t,e:
distinction between the admission of oral and extrin: c.;.
evidence for the purpose of identifying the land des/\.
and applying the description to the property, and tha~h'.
supplying and adding to the description insufficient an'.·.
on its face.
.c.
In the instant case, though parol evidence was

Ji~

introduced over obJ'ection,l.2/ the parol evidence receive
· a onl;·
highlighted the insufficiency of the contractual description,·
intent to negotiate boundaries, and the continuing
the parties.

disagreeme~·

Trial, in fact, revealed 1 i ttle more than the p.

city of contiguous fences on the ground and that the parties
vigorously disputed the areas referred to in the contract of
pu.::chase.
The fact that appellants in the instant case sporac·
ically occupied two homes on opposite sides of old U. S. High•
91 located at Anderson Junction does not aid, as Justice Ellet:
suggests, a judicial determination of what approximate 10 acr::·

with those two homes.
taken ".

.

For, as stated in Adams, possessionmu:·i

. in pursuant of the parol contract proved; that

5
'::

possession was notorious; that it was exclusive and of the~
tract of land which was the subject of the contract
P. at 467 (emphasis added).

A perhaps clearer statement

• n'

H:

of~

foregoing doctrine is found in Campbell v. Nelson, 102 Utah i:,
125 P.2d 413 at 415 (1942), wherein the Utah Supreme Court di!'
entiates acts of part performance from the establishment off
contract itself as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-n-

until the parties have agreed as to the terms, there is not
an enforceable contract in fact, and partial performance
cannot make up for the deficiency in the understanding
between the parties.
(Id., emphasis added)
Clearly, as the boundaries were subject to negotiation,
possession of the homes does not aid in their discovery.
Again, the threshold question is one of contract, and
the~

Court's citation to Roberts on Frauds, Section 135, is

particularly enlightening.
To call anything a part performance, before the existence of the thing (the contract) whereof it is said to be
part performance is established, is an anticipation of proof
by assumption, and gets rid of the statute by jumping over
it, for the statute requires proof and prescribes the medium
of proof.
As to the standard of proof required for spec i fie performance of
such contracts, Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491
at 493 (1967) sets the Utah standard:
The contract must be free from doubt, vagueness, and
ambiguity, so as to leave nothing to conjecture or to be
supplied by the court. It must be sufficiently certain and
definite in its terms to leave no reasonable doubt of the
specific thing equity is called upon to have performed, and
it must be sufficiently certain as to its terms so that the
court may en force it as actually made by the parties. A
greater degree of certainty is required for specific performance in equity than is necessary to establish a contract
as the basis of an action at law for damages.
Part performance, is, thus, not a doctrine without a
rationally limited appl ica ti on.

The Utah Supreme Court has

accepted the universal principle that only when the parties' minds
have met and part per forrnance thereafter occurred may their contract be removed from the Statute of Fraud's proscriptions.
Acceptable evidence pertaining to the tract itself may identify,
tut not supply, the tract's description.

Acts of part performance
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are not a substitute for the prerequisite meeting of th
~

recent case, Holmaren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, 534
(Utah 1975), is perhaps the most precise
doctrine's breadth and applicability.

state~ent

to

e mind:

p. 2d 61!

aate

of:

In
, a unan·imous opinion

drafted by Justice Maughan, and with deference to a well r
- easo:
note in the Utah Law Review, the Holmgren Court stated as fol!•,
An analysis of our statute, with its qualifying com·
pan ion al lowing speci fie performance, in the decisions~'
this court, most of which, to 1964, are noted in Vol. g',
1, Utah Law Review, p. 91, give us criteria describing'
conditions, which must necessarily exist before an oral
contract for the sale of an interest in land can be enfor:•
The oral contract and its terms must be clear, de fire
mutually understood, and established by clear, unequi'loca:
and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quai.
In addition, there must be acts of part performance whicn
equity are considered sufficient to take the case out of:
statute of frauds:
( 1) Any improvements must be substant::
or valuable, or beneficial.
(2) A valuable consideratior..
demanded by equity.
(3) If there is possession, suchpos:•
sion must be actual, open, definite, not concurrent with~
vendor, but it must be with the consent of the vendor. r:
Such acts as are relied on must be exclusively referrabJe·
the contract.
Justice Maughan' s opinion is no less applicable today, the su:·
stance thereof no less accurate.

As stated in 73 Am.Jur.2d

"Statute of Frauds" §401:
Since the doctrine of part performance had its origin i~,,
equity prior to the statute of frauds, it is not surpn''.';'
to find that the doctrine can be asserted to secure speci .
performance of a contract of which there is no memorandum
writing, as required by the statute, only wh~r~ .. the ci~~:;:
stances of the case meet the general prerequ1s1c.es to · i
table relief.
Courts of equity decline to enforce a ~ar:r:
agreement for the sale of real estate on the ground
Pi•
performance unless the case is clearly within ~he rec~~~;;
principles of equity jurisprudence. The doctrine op~amaa'
if, but only if, the remedy of law by a reco':"ery ofwhich:
or otherwise is inadequate and the contract is one
in writing would be enforceable in equity.

0
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The contract must be fully made and completed in every
respect except for the writing required by the statute, in
order to be enforceable on the ground of part performance.
The parol agreement relied upon must be certain, definite,
clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal in its terms, particularly where the agreement is between parent and child, and
it must be clearly established by the evidence.
The requisite
of clear and definiteness extends to both the terms and the
subject matter of the contract.
In light of the foregoing, it is impossible to reconcile
the following two excerpts from the Opinion filed by this Court on
January 9, 19 7 9; one stating a fact,

the other, this Court's

conclusion on appeal:
During the four years after execution of the document noted
ante [P-17], the parties attempted to reach agreements about
the description of the land which was sold to the defendants
[sic, plaintiffs].
Buyers and sellers each set forth proposed
legal descriptions, but neither would accept the other's
designation.

The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towards
the full price takes the matter out of the statute of frauds.
B.

The trial court, on the basis of overwhelminq
evidence, specifically found that no agreement,
oral or otherwise, was ever reached between the
litigants resolving the boundaries.
Petitioners ask this Court to re-examine the statement

of facts recited herein, the testimony of the parties, and the
exhibits on file as part of the designated supplemental record.
The lower court, after hearing all of the evidence preferred
~lative to the determination of boundaries, and the intentions

and subsequent acts of the parties relative to the January 2nd

~cument, entered a specific finding which is decisive of the
applicability of the part performance doctrine.

F.ind.ing No.

states as follows:
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7

""
The Court finds that Russe 11 Ca 11 made several t ·
each year between January 2, 1969, and the filinrips to
.
1 aswui, t in
Marc h of 1 973, and that on several oc g Of. tf··
,
d aries
.
d.iscussed, but no subsequent agrecas1on,·
noun
were
.
ement
h
or ot erwise, was ever reached that resolved the b''
R. 260.
am 1gu·
On appeal, to dispute that finding, this Court rn~s:
cl ude that there is no evidence in the record to support it,
that all reasonable minds would so find.
560 P.2d 1110 (Utah 1977).

Robertson v. Hutck·.

Clearly, no contract

can~ ~~

1

the Opinion's language that acts of part performance take "tr.,
matter out of the statute of frauds" is, at best, improvident,
Further, the Opinion's zeal in reaching a result

00:

cates the problematic descriptive language with the followino
commentary:
It is clear that the Stauffers purchased the two k
and the land about them within natural boundaries amount~
to approximately 10 acres.
It is also clear that they;:
chased all of the land on the south side of the freeway,;
and except the fenced farm ground amounting to approxiia:
40 acres, together with 2/Sths of the water rights. !ti
also clear that the Stauffers purchased one-half of all 1
the remaining property of Cal 1, which was to be held as
tenants in common.
The above simply misstates the January 2nd document's divisic:
water rights and directional references therein.

Furthermore,!

sufficient natural boundaries are non-existent, even as liberi
defined by Justice Ellett, the issues of which 10 acres arouiil
homes as well as which 40 acres to be retained become t~~
point of the lawsuit.

Even the appellants had some self-serv:

difficulty with the description.

At trial, they asserted thi!'

40 acres clearly to be retained by the Calls meant

1.1 ttle mor:

on the othe:
than a parcel bounded on two sides by a f ence and
a sloping ridge comprising approximately 18.3 acres.
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The parties' minds never met.
determined.

The boundaries were never

Part performance as a doctrine is inapplicable.
POINT IV

~HE SUPREME COORT'S SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION OF
THE DOCTRINE OF PART~RFORMANCE, EVEN WERE THAT
DOCTRINE APPLICABLE, VIOLATES LONG-STANDING PRECEDENT REGARDING JUDICIAL REVIEW.

Contracts for the sale of interests in land under Section 25-5-3 of the Utah Code are void unless there is a writing,
complete in all its material terms, subscribed to by the vendor.
Thls statute, commonly known as the Statute of Frauds, is basically
w~tantive,
~n

not procedural.

The material terms of such contracts

been variously described.

According to Pomeroy, the five

essential features of a contract for the sale of land are parties,
subject matter, mutual promises, price, and consideration.

Pomeroy,

Specific Performance of Contracts, §87 (3rd Ed. 1926); see also,
71 Am.Jur.2d "Specific Performance", §34 (1973).

Nonetheless, the

doctrine of part performance has been commonly used to circumvent
ilie Statute of Frauds when the courts can otherwise ascertain a
clear, unambiguous and mutually understood contract between the
parties.

Such a contract, however, must be established by unequi-

vocal and definite testimony.
534 P.2d 611

Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Bal 1 ard,

(Utah 1975).

In the instant case, appellants ~ pled, even through
Pre-trial, the doctrine of part performance as a bar to petitioners'
defenses properly before the trial court and framed under the
Statute of Frauds.

The doctrine of part performance was further

oot tried by consent to the trial court. and insofar as the
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district judge found that there had never been a meeting ,
o.

t·

minds on one of the essential elements of the contract, the"
t·

requisite to the applicability of the doctrine was lackin g,
appeal, neither counsel raised or discussed the

doctri~.

::

Supreme Court, however, sua sponte, stated as follows:
The taking of possession and the payment of $6,400 towaf
the full purchase price takes the matter out of the stat:
of frauds.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized the princ
that defenses not properly before the trial court nor
in assignments of error could not be raised on appeal,
Estate, 99 Utah 373, 104 P.2d 210 (1940).

referre~

-

In Re:

Thus, issues, new:,

proposed after trial, were axiomatically not considered by th::

Court.~/

The issue of judical consideration of newly raisec

defenses, however, normally came as a result of zealous counse.
raising the same on appeal.

Meyer v. Deluke, 23 U.2d 74, 451:

966 (1969); Davis v. Barrett, 24 U.2d 162, 467 P.2d 603, (191:
Huber v. Deep Creek Irr. Co., 6 U.2d 15, 305 P.2d 478 (1956):
North Salt Lake v. St. Joseph Water
P.2d 577 (1950).

&

Irr. Co., 118 Utah 60~,

The reasoning and legal function of summar:

rejecting such defenses was succinctly stated by Justice Crod'

who, in Wagner v. Olsen, 25 U.2d 366, 370, 482 P.2d 702 (19711
stated as follows:
Matters neither raised in the pleadings nor put in issue
at the trial cannot be considered for the first time.on
appeal.
In Simpson v. General Motors Corporation th 15
court held that a party may not inject a new doctnne
upon which to predicate liability for the first time on
appeal.
This court stat2d:
se is
. Orderly procedure, whose proper pur~o ~~
the final settlement of controversy, requires
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.

a party must present his entire case
or theories of recovery to the trial
having done so, he cannot thereafter
oifferent theory and thus attempt to
a ~erry-go-round of litigation.

and his theory
court; and
change to some
keep in motion

rd. at 370, cites omitted.
An earlier case specifically applied this basic rule of
appellate advocacy to prevent the assertion of estoppel as a bar

w ~e

assertion of the Statute of Frauds where there had been

ample opportunity at trial to amend and plead that bar.
"·Goodrich,
--

231 P.2d 730 (Utah 1951).

Collett

Appellants had four years

to plead and argue part performance, but never chose to do so.
On appeal, Justice Ellett, sua sponte, not only proposed
the doctrine of part performance as an affirmative defense to the
Statute of Frauds, but in fact the thrust of the Opinion found
that the same was disposi tive of the lawsuit!
~at

It is incongruous

an independent Supreme Court would not only propose a theory

of recovery, but without argument thereon, embrace the same as
controlling, even though not raised by any of the parties to the
appeal.

This anomaly can best be explained by the fact that

Justice Ellett felt that the trial court had, for whatever reason,
denied the appellants their day in court, he, having inadvertently
viewed only that portion of the record indicating that the case
was decided on motions for summary judgment.

Had this case been

so ?ostured, the Supreme Court could legitimately consider that

doctrine, if only marginally inferable from the record, to remand
for triai.

Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1976).
The Opinion's final instruction to the trial court to

take evidence "as to what was said and done" clearly indicates that
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Justice Ellett inadvertently felt the trial court had pr
the introduction of such testimony by summarily d
their day in court.

even
·
eny1ng appe::

In fact, appellants rested at trial, ans

their theory of recovery was rejected.
The novel assertion of part performance on appeal
as a surprise to petitioners.

Cc

As this Court summarily reject;

newly raised defenses after trial, it begs the question thatt·
Court should not position itself as advocate, both raising a:.'
ruling on its own affirmative defenses.

POINT V
THE OPINION ASSUMED A HYPOTHETICAL CASE,
PLACED THE PARTIES IN THE HYPOTHETICAL
SITUATION, AND RULED: JUDICIAL INQUIRY rs
NOT ILLUMINATED BY POSTULATING WHAT MIGHT
HAVE HAPPENED UNDER OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES.
Counsel for petitioners has previously addressed th:
Court pertaining to the anomalous taking of judicial notice o:
hypothetical situation on appeal.

In essence, the

Opinioo~

structed a paradigm comprised of five fictions:
( 1)
That the parties did not intend further negofa
tions on the boundaries when contracting on January 2, '.'
(2)
That the "boundaries", whether stone walls on:
fences, were sufficient to enable a proper judicial deter·
mination of their nature.

( 3)
That there had been a meetina of the minds on;'.
contractual terms as to the nature and- extent of those
boundaries.
( 4)
That the fact that the sellers knew of buyers'.
sporadic occupation of the homes constituted the formers
consent to the same.
(5)
That the sellers should not prevail, having::~.
idly by waiting for the materialization of a "mighty w
fall".
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4

With regard to the above, the trial court, after hearing
all the testimony preferred by appellants, eliminated as a finding
~

those fictions posed in points 1, 2, 3 and 5 above.

The

oniy remaining inference not particularly ruled on by the lower
court is No. 4.

Preliminary to this discussion, however, peti-

tioners would again refer the Court to Adams v. Manning, Campbell

v. Nelson, and Holmgren Brothers, Inc. v. Ballard, noted supra,
which all hold that peaceful occupation is not a substitute for
mutual understanding under the part performance doctrine.
Regarding appellants' intermittent possession of some
rather loosely-defined areas not co-extensive with those parcels
appellants claimed below, the Supreme Court made the following two
statements:
Sellers were aware of appellants' occupation and possession
of the land and of their improvements of the houses.

By refusing to agree on the exact description of the land
sold and in which plaintiffs were placed in possession, the
seller could hope for a mightly windfall by selling it at its
enhanced value to others.
First, i t cannot be gainsaid that the possession by appellants was
at best sporadic until the suit was filed in early 1973.
T.217:28-218:3)
~rticularly

(R.24,'[4;

The above use of the passive voice, however, is

peculiar.

A disinterested third party might asscme

~rt Mr. and Mrs. Call placed the buyers into possession of the

homes and certain de fined surrounding areas.

In reality, the

Calls reasonably assumed that as Mr. Stauffer was employed in 1969
in California, the Stau ffers would not be making plans to imll'ed

lately occupy the property.

At trial, Mr. Stauffer offered D-13

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-37-

..
as his notification to the Calls of his wife's plans

on leavi:

California, moving furniture and, in general starting renova'.:
of the houses.

(T.85:2-14)

That exhibit, a letter drafted:,
'·

ruary 12, 1969, is in the file.

A cursory examination of it

reveals nothing about the Stauffers' intent to split up the fr
with Mrs. Stauffer moving to Utah and making improveme nt s, I.:!
[W] e are planning on going up this next Thursday the 20ti
We plan to be going into the houses and doing a lot of
looking around
At trial, Mr. Call recounted his surprise upon disc:
ing that Mrs. Stauffer had occupied the small house when hev;,
the property in April 1969 to negotiate the boundaries.
14)

(T.l'

Mr. Call further testified that he never expected the Sta.

to move in until the contract had been finalized.

(Id.) Pet::

do not contest their discovery of appellants' occupation, and:
haps even initial indifference regarding the same.

After all,

petitioners also expected that the boundaries would be amicat'.
settled.

But, to equate the petitioners' knowledge with an1 ..

consent as part of a scheme to fraudulently improve their rea:
estate, is as logical as ruling that we as members of the Bar
consent to widespread world hunger, insofar as there are none
among us who lack knowledge of it, and most could do sornethinc
about it.
tr·

This Court has repeatedly stated that on appeals ·

plenary trials, its rulings should be confined to matters apF"
from the record.

Further, the trial court is allowed a broad

latitude due to its advantaged position in weighing the credi·
bility of witnesses'

testimony and in selecting t h a t
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testimc;·
·

to believe in entering its findings of fact and concluch,O Oces
~
sions of law.

The Opinion never states that any finding as entered

was not substantially supported by the record.

Instead, the

Opinion indulges in fiction upon fiction, constructing an imaginary
matrix or paradigm i;;. which, were this the case, the appellants
would be allowed to prevail.

Judicial inquiry into what could

happen under other circumstances, however, is best addressed as
dictum and not as a fulc:::-um to elevate disagreement and ambiguity
to the status of a contract before the Utah Supreme Court.

There

is no public policy to be served by creating an ad hoc ruling
without prior precedent based upon a mental paradigm of what the
facts miaht have been under other circumstances.
POINT VI
THE SUPREME COURT OPINION ASSUMES THE EXISTENCE
OF SUFFICIENT BOUNDARIES, EITHER FENCES OR WALLS,
AND ASKS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO TP.E IMPOSSIBLE AND
DELINEATE THEM; NO SUCH FENCES AND WALLS EXIST ON
THE PROPERTY WITHIN WHICH THE PARCELS MAY BE
LOCATED.
The Opinion has instructed the trial court to define
natural boundaries as stone walls and wire fences, and on that
~sis with the addition of parol testimony "decide what was the

l~al description of the land included in the agreement to pur-

chase".

The assumption that such walls and fences exist to enable

the trial court to appropriately make this determination is simply
~ontrary to both the parol and physical

testimony in this case.

An

excerpt from the examination of the appellants' surveyor at summary judgment is perhaps illuminating:
Q
Could vou tell from the face of this contract, from the
legal description attached and knowing where those two houses
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are, could you describe with certainty and as a
exactly wh at ten acres, collectively, went with lana su~,,
"
houses?
those tw
A
No.
I think it is impossible to follow natur
aries all the way around both these two houses. T~ 1 bou~'
some natural boundaries adjacent to those two house:re ar;
all the way around the property.
'~
So you' re saying that parts could be considered as.
natural boundary. What is a natural boundary, Mr. Day?'

Q

A
Well, anything that might serve as a property line 1
a fence or a wall or a road or anything of that nature. ·
Are there more than one possibility for natural bou~'
aries surrounding those houses?
··

Q

A
There are several different possibilities that estat·
lishes the boundaries of this property, yes.
(R.296 aU
At trial, some thirteen months later, it isunderstr
able why the appellants did not cal 1 Gale Day, their surveyor,·
the stand.

Further, the uncontroverted trial testimony of Mar::

Mal nor, a licensed surveyor, was similar to that of Mr. Day, ti
is, that either of two radically different surveys were possfa
ities under the terms of the contract.

In fact, as Mr. Day in'.

cated earlier, the description can be variously platted due tc:
paucity· of fences and other natural boundaries on the ground.
The above becomes abundantly clear upon examination'
the following four exhibits, which should be readily available
the Court in the Clerk's office: D-2 and P-18 primarily depict
manner in which U.S. Highway 91 bifurcates Anderson Junction a:
separates the smaller house from the large.:-.

A fence and ceoe~
. . b . t 5 are 111

indicated on the southernmost portion of those exih1 1
on property owned by Owen Cottam.

Both exhJ... bits clearly shoi'

but one of the fences and walls, either by depicting lines wi:
"

~h!

small x' s through them or by the designation "rock wall · ·
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fence not depicted thereon is located on the east side of

o. s .

. hwav• 91 and runs basically east to WFO!st, north of where Parcol
-

P,19'

is depicted on D-2 and P-18.
No. 4
~3

This fence has been platted on

and the area adjacent thereto is easily visualized in an
photograph, D-93.
A closer examination of P-18 shows a rather sporadic

scattering of fences to the west of U.S. Highway 91.

Appellants'

designated parcel 2-A, comprised by parcel 2 and parcel 1 on the
~st,

follows fences, walls or other natural boundaries so rarely

that it strains credibility to believe that the Court could examine
that document and find the appellants' version of testimony believable.

Clearly, the platted dimensions viewed as solid lines are

not co-extensive with the few existing fences designated as lines
crosshatched with small x' s.

On the east side of U.S. Highway 91,

the problem is even more severe, as there are but two fences,
neither one contiguous and one again not shown on P-18 or D-2.
Testimony elicited at trial confirmed that all the
~rties

knew the boundaries remained unsettled, subject to nego-

tiation, and that the survey proferred by appellants generally
failed to follow any natural lines.

Further, a surveyor's uncon-

trwerted testimony declared that, being familiar with the land,
the radically different descriptions as platted on D-3 and P-18
h~ both possibilities under the January 2,

1969, document.

Oltimately, P-94, prepared by Mrs. Stauffer, Hlustrates but one
~~ idea of the possible shapes of the parcels she sought to

purchase.

Her illustration is again visibly different from the

::1 att ·
·
.ing selected by her surveyor, Mr. Day, in
1972.

As the
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surveyors both testified in the record that the determinaticr
boundaries was impossible, it is incongrous at best to exp
trial court to perform this function.

ect.

As it stands, therefor:

the remand not only requires the trial judge to fabricate bou:
aries which do not exist, but to compel independent minds cbv:
far apart to agree to those fabrications;

the judiciary shouJ,:

cautious in eliminating the exercise of volition through thee.
of contractual construction.
POINT VII
THE JANUARY 9, 1979, OPINION IN
INSTRUCTS THE TRIAL COURT TO DO
ACCOMPLISHED, THAT IS, TAKE THE
WHAT WAS SAID AND DONE TO PROVE

CASE NO. 15468
SOMETHING ALREMY
TESTIMONY AS TO
BOUNDARIES.

In its penultimate paragraph, the Opinion instructs
the trial court to take testimony as to what was saiC. and done
not to discover the truth, but "to decide what was the legal
description of the land included in the agreement to purchase.'
Obviously, the Court has inadvertently been denied access to
the designated transcript.

An Appendix attached to this brie'.

clearly outlines that at plenary trial, the lower court, over·
objections, received all of the evidence, both documentary an:
parol, preferred by appellants to prove the descriptioo.
Even after admitting all of appellants' evidence,
including that objectionable under the parol evidence rule, ti ·
trier of fact found the substance thereof nebulous, inconsist::
and legally inconclusive.

On appeal, this Court

mistakenlY 1 ~'·

· evider
that appellants were somehow precluded from introduc1~
·
·
preferred to prove descriptions.
this true.

At no pl ace

i' n

the record

Insofar, therefore, as all the testimony
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15

as to w;;

was said and done to prove descriptions was _!="eceived,

the nature

of ~ch further testimony to be taken is clouded on remand.
Clearly, this confusing instruction is due to Justice El let having
inadvertently failed to review the transcript.
The further suggestion of the Opinion, that the trier
of fact take testimony and then decide the description assumes the
certainty of that testimony and denies the district judge his prerogative to disbelieve the substance of a witness's statement.
Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958).

See

The lower

court, having taken such testimony, already found the parties never
~reed
~~een

on a final description, a matter of long-standing importance
them.

Justice Wilkins' statement in dissent is precisely

en point:
This case serves uniquely as an instance of appellate
insistence that a contract for the sale of real property
be specifically performed by the Court's supplying the
description where the contract does not identify and was
not intended to id en ti fy the property to be sold.
Beyond the prophetic sagacity of that dissent, the Opinion
also represents a unique instance in which once the bad faith of
petitioners had been hypothesized, it suddenly became true for the
~urt.

Thereafter, the petitioners' version of testimony, believed

by the trial judge, no longer became believable or acceptable to
the appellate tribunal.
be stated:

On remand, the instruction might as well

Do not believe the pei tioners' story in this case.
POINT VIII
COURTS OF EQUITY CANNOT COMPEL AGREEMENT WHERE
NONE EXISTS; THERE IS NO LEGITIMATE EXERCISE CF
EQUITABLE JURISDICTION OVER A STATE OF MIND.
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At trial, all of the signers of the January 2 d
ocur,
who were called testified that they understood that the b .

ounci·

would have to be settled at a future date in an amicable and
neighborly fashion.

The trial court specifically found that,

though negotiations ensued, the same were fruitless and the a,,,..
eation of boundaries was never agreed upon.

The Opinion has:

instructed the trial court to "take testimony as to what was

of~

and done and then decide what was the legal description
land included in the agreement of purchase."

,
1

Thereafter, the

trial judge "should order a conveyance of that land to the
Stauffers

n

In Pitcher v. Lauritzen, 18 Utah 2d 368, 423

P.2d~':

(1967), the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated:
Specific performance cannot be required unless all b
of the agreement are clear.
The court cannot compel the
performance of a contract which the parties did not mutua:
agree upon.
Id. at 493, citing Bowman v. Reyburn, 155Co:
82, 170 P.2d 271 (1946) (emphasis added).
The Bowman opinion, re £erred to in Pitcher, explainE'.
the logical and sel £-evident rationale for such a limitation:
citing Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 178, 42 L.EI
584 (1897), as follows:
'Equity,' this court said in Hunt v. Rousmaniere' s Adm'n,
Pet. 1, 14 L.Ed. 27, 'may compel parties to perform theH
agreements, when fully entered into, acco:cding to their.
terms· but it has no power to make agreements for the par.:
and then cornpe 1 them to execute the same. The former 155:
legitimate branch of its jurisdiction, and in its exe~~l'
highly bene ficio.l to society.
The latter is. wi thou\~h:er
authority, and the exercise of it would be highly mi
in its consequences.'
Utah courts have also rejected such judicial interve·
tion disguised in the cloaks of egui ty primarily because
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it in(

,...

manipulation of a state of mind, be it deemed the volition, will,
In Whi tehil 1 v. Lowe, 1 o Utah 419,

or free agency of the parties.
37 p, 589 (1894),

for example, the Utah Supreme Court declined to

enforce a contract for the joint operation of a mine "upon the
basis to be agreed upon".

Id. at 590.

More recently, Justice

Ellett, writing perhaps what is now the lead case, discussed the
principle in Jensen v. Bouwhuis, 577 P.2d 555 (Utah 1978).
In Jensen all of the elements to a contract, except an
important provision for partial releases, had been agreed upon
~~een

the parties.

The trial court, nonetheless, granted the

purchaser speci fie performance.

Regarding the partial release

clause which had been previously left to negotiation, the district
Judge indicated he would make the agreement, and, should the seller
still refuse to agree, compensate the buyer.
!~er

In reversing the

court, Justice Ellett clarified the legitimate problems of

equity as follows:

The courts have never felt that it was their duty to
write a contract for the parties; and where the matters are
not clearly set out, courts of equity refuse to grant specific
performance.
In the case of Davison v. Robbins, et al., the vendee
was to select two hundred acres of land from a larger tract
which was properly described.
The vendee sued for specific
performance and this Court held:
. . . The issue was whether the description was sufficient so that there was a valid contract which would be
enforced by specific performance. This court cited
Scanlon v. Oliver, 42 Minn. 538, 44 N.W. 1031 wherein
the court explained the relevant distinctions between
two types of-cases.
In one, the contract grants one
party the exclusive right of selection, and the contract
thus provides a definite means by whicn the location and
description of the land may be definitely determined
without any further agreement of the parties.
In the
other type, the writing provides that the particular
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piece of property to be conveyed is to be mut
agreed upon by the parties, i.e., the mode prualJy.
the location and description of the land is t~v~~
agreement of the parties.
In the Calder case ~hfutc'.
concluded that the writing constituted a valid 15 '.
enforceable contract, since the agreement provi~::.
the vendee was to select the land within a giv
.·
·
an d ~ot h ing
more h ad to be agreed upon betwe~ en~ ti··
parties.
e
In the instant ac~ion, the agreement in clear"
terms provided that the location a~~
tion of the land to be conveyed was subject to the
future mutual agreement of the parties. This writi•·
constituted a mere expression of a purpose to make·:
contract in the future, for the whole matter was co'.
tingent on further negotiations. The trial court er
in its con cl us ions that the writing constituted a ·
valid, enforceable contract.
u~ambiguous

The trial court ordered the parties to agree ( sometL
they did not do in the signed document or thereafter), an,:
case they could not agree within thirty days, the judge 'i:
make a contract for them which neither had ever thought o'
making; and if the purchaser did not accept the judge'st
of the new con tract, he, the purchaser could get the mont
back which he paid at the time the seller signed t~~u
Money Receipt, plus interest. No option was given he seJ:
he is stuck with the judge's idea as to what terms they
should have agreed upon.

This Court will not compound the error by ordering speci'.:
performance.
Id. at 558.
The thrust of Jensen, that courts cannot grant speci:
performance of contracts wherein important matters remain unse:'
between the parties, is a fundamental principle of equity juri
prudence.

See also BLT Investment Co. v. Snow, No. 15593, an

opinion written by Justice Hall and concurred in by all justict
to the Court.

Simply stated, the judiciary may not

draft~:

, t'10n c
parties important provisions explicitly left for negotia
·
thP'

rewrite their contract under the guise of construction and ·
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Judicially compel their adherence to a contract outside their
contemplation.

As stated in 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts", §242:

courts cannot make for the parties better or more equitable
agreements than they themselves have been satisfied to make,
or rewrite contracts because they operate harshly or ineouitably as to one of the parties, or alter them for the
b~nefit of one party and to the detriment of the other, or,
by construction, relieve one of the parties from terms which
he voluntarily consented to, or impose on him those which he
did not.
The Stauffer v. Call Opinion does little more than to
~ttoduce

the district judge as a third party to the contract

negotiated by the parties, who al 1 expressly understood that the
boundaries were subject to future agreement.

The Opinion' s man-

date that the judge "decide what was the description of the land
i~luded

in the agreement to purchase" loses sight of the lower

coort's express finding that the parties never agreed on boundaries, despite substantial effort.

The Opinion, thus, not only

exceeds the bounds of equity recited in Jensen, but further compels
~e ~titioners

boundaries.

to agree to a judicially imposed selection of

This is the very mischief that equity should rigor-

ously avoid.
CONCLUSION
Appellants' initial action sought specific performance
of a real estate contract which all the signers understood left
boundaries subject to future negotiation.

Nonetheless, one of the

appellants moved to the property knowing the boundaries were not
settled.

Though petitioners accepted payments, they did so with

the conviction that tht! boundaries would be worked out.

tiations ensued ar,d were fruitless.

Nego-

The lower court, after plenary

~tiaJ, found the requisite meeting of the minds on the contract
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had never taken place.

That finding is supported by ~b

stant_,

all of the credible physical and parol testimony in the

.
recor:
Appel 1 an ts conceded that their improvements wer
e o:
aid in determining the boundaries; similarly, improvement
s ace

panied by payments are no substitute for contractual understar.
and assent.

After plenary trial, the appellants rested, havi:

'

had al 1 their testimony pro ferred to prove boundaries receive:
the trier of fact.

Appellants failed to meet their burden a~i

their theory of recovery was rejected.
This Court, on appeal, reversed.

Taking judicial

no:,

of rising land values, the Opinion's author hypothesized that
petitioners could have stood idly by, re fusing to bargain
faith and waiting for a "mighty wind fal 1".

in~

Not only were pefr

tioners not afforded a hearing pertaining to such notice, buL
substance of the same flies in the face of the record on appea:
and findings entered by the lower court.
Having once clothed the petitioners in black wool, t·
Opinion raised its own affirmative defense to the Statute of

Frauds, part performance, and despite the legal inapplicabilit'
that doctrine, found the same di sposi ti ve of the case.

The Jc.

court should, according to the Opinion, take the testimony ofc
parties and decide the legal description of the conveyance.

1
·'

this has already been unsuccessfully accomplished, the lowercc
must now simply create a contract for the parties where none
exists and then compel its enforcement.

This caprice is clear:

beyond the legitimate objectives of equity jurisdiction.
Ultimately, it becomes clear that the Opinion' 5 aut:
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'd

a~

t
due to an inadvertent dishevelment of the records,
no ,

access to the trial

transcript.

have

The thrust of the ruling in

essence is to afford the appellants their day in court, something
~

fult had been

sum~arily

denied them.

This inadvertent mistake

should not be knowingly compounded on rehearing.

RESPECTFUL1Y SUBMITTED this

~..fh

day of February, 1979.

~~¥

Attorney for Petitioners
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Gru'KTIONS Al.'-.'D DISPOSITION THERIDF AT TRU>.L

Grounds

Gbjecticn

Disposition

RWr

Tiireliness

Under advise.'leilt (4: 29)

tau::'fer' s testi.rrony
l:'.6 To S

~IDH

Irrelevant; i.rmaterial

Denied-can be renewed
(18:29)

To Stauffer's testi.rrony

MDH

Parol evidence; vary contract; i=elevant;
i.rmaterial

Denied (19:8)

MOH

Relevancy; rrateriality
parol evidence rule

overruled (21:4)

l:ll To Stauffer's testi.rrony

MOH

Continuing objection on
parol evidence rule

overruled on continuing
objection; renew if
appropriate (21:16)

l:28 To Stauffer's testirrony
of telephone conver.

MOH

Foundation

Sustained (21:30)

3:24 To Stauffer's testi.'IDny
of Jan. 2 rreeting

MOH

Parol evidence

overruled at this point
(23:26)

4:24 To Stauffer's testirrony

MOH

Docurrent speaks for itself

It rray stand (24: 26)

5:25 To Stauffer' s testirrony
about the 10 acres

MOH

Parol evidence rule; varying temis of contract

overruled (25:27)

~:9

To Stauffer's testirrony
about contract

t-[)H

Parol evidence rule

overruled (26:10)

b:8

To Stauffer' s testirrony
about house

MOH

Identity of house

Court restated question
(27:11)

MOH

Unresponsive

It rray stand (28:18)

~: 22 To Bishop's question
about 10 acres

MOH

Leading; asked and
answered

Leading but overruled
(28:25-26)

l9:5 To Stauffer's a.<swer

t-[)H

Unresponsive

Court restated question
(29:7)

MOH

Unresponsive

It goes out (30:6)

1::

To Bishop ' s lmended
~ 11
complaint " i-<ep ~

of Nov. 1968 rreeting

l:i

of Nov. 1968 rreeting
l::

To Stauffer's testi.rrony

of telephone ccnver.

about UREC

~:17 To Stauffer's answer

about 10 acres

regarding conversation
~:;

~::2

T0

Stauffer's answer
about !::x:iundaries

Stauffer's ansv:er
t-[)H Parol evidence rule; can't Overruled ( 31: 5)
:il::out !::x:iundaries
contract
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Page/
Line

Objection

By

Grou.~ds

Di~~

-i

31:12

To Bishop's question

MOH

Leading

31:24

To Bishop's question

MOH

Foundation

31:29

To Bishop's question

1-'IDH Asked and answered

Overnuea 3

31:23

To Stauffer's answer
about what was said

,'1JJH

Gnresponsive

Question.,
Bishop 1i:~

31:27

To Stauffer's answer
about conversation

MDH

Unresponsive

Question"'
Bishop 11:~\

34:17

To Stauffer's testinony
about conversation

MOH

I=elevant; imrraterial

Question"'
Bishop (J~;;

35:8
35:12

To Stauffer's testirrony
about lease of farm

MOH

Irrelevant; irnrraterial

Overrule<: .

36:5

To Stauffer's answer
about conversation

MOH

Unresponsive

Sustained•·

36:18

To Bishop's question
about Exhibit 18

~[)H

Exhibit not in existence
on January 2, 1969

Alla.ied foq
pUJ.1XJses ('.d

37:24

To Bishop's question
about alfalfa crop

MOH

Pelevancy; materiality

Overrule<l 1. ,
I

38:11

To Bishop's question
about farm land

MOH Asked and answered

Allowed-wit;
trouble Iii (

38:26

To Stauffer's answer
about conversation

MOH

Unresponsive

Question rel
Bishop (30::

39:25

To Bishop's question
about small house

MOH

Relevancy and materiality
to contract

Overruled
after disc::o
counsel (J~•:'

48:7

To Bishop's question
about large house

MOH

ReleV"'....ncy and materiality

Overrule.:,,
'":I

49:6

To Stauffer's testinony
about additions

MOH

Foundation

sustained?

49:19

To Bishop's question
about additions

MOH

Like date identified

sustajned '.:·

50:11

To Stauffer's answer
about buildings

MOH

Unresponsive

Question r2'
Bishop

51:3

MOH No testi.'!Ony about
To Stauffer's testirrony
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Let him f·
(31:13) -,

Sustaine::: i

:J

Answer 'ill~,'
tine (51:,

Obj~

11;e,

~
!:ll

By

Grounds

MOH

Foundation

Question restated by
Bishop (52:16)

Bishop' s question

.'IDH

Foundation

Overruled (52:29)

To Stauffer' s testi.r:nny

11DH

Unresponsive

Let him start his answe.

To Stauffer's testirrony

atcut conversation
i· '7
·~

J:l2

Disposition

'fo

~ut conversation
t.

aJ;out conversa ion

(53:13)

To Stauffer's testirrony
al;out conversation

MOH

]: 29

To Bishop's request

MOH

Relevance and rrateriality

Overruled (54: 7)

):1

To Stuaffer ' s testirrony

MOH

Identity of fence being
discussed

GJ into it on c=ssexamination (55:10)

J:lS

Unresponsive

Court restated question
(53:19)

t..'lat witness mark exhibit
atout ferice line

7:11

To publication of Call' s
depcsition

wW

Foundation

Sustained (57:15)

i:27

To Hughes' question
atout R.E. contracts

WRB

Witness not qualified
to give answer

Overruled (76: 29)

To Stauffer's testirrony

w'RB

Docurrent speaks for itself

Overruled (84: 25)

MOH

Framing of question

Sustained (102:24)

l

4:23

al::out letter to Call
02:21 To Bishop's question

al::out natural boundaries
j

03:22 To Stauffer's testirrony

It goes out (103:24)

MOH

regarding conversation

t5:5

To Stauffer' s testirrony

~IDH

Object as to form

Overruled (105:7)

MOH

Pa=l testirrony to
change written contract

Overruled (108:19)

regarding visit of Call

1s:l5

To Stauffer's testirrony

al::out walk with Call

~9:15

To form of answer by
Mrs. Stauffer

MOH Like to have her rrark

To Stauffer's testirrony

directions take.ri

No action (109:24)
(not for.ral objection)

MOH

Relevancy and rrateriality

Overruled (115: 3)

l5:13 To Bishop's question

MOH

Relevancy and rrateriality

Overruled (115:16)

15:25 Tc Bisr,cp' s questioE

MDH

Parol evidence rule;
statute of frauds

overruled (115: 27)

lS:l

al:x:iut sale of farm

li:~O T

? Stauffer's testirrony
or condition of Parcel 1

MOH What is parcel l

Bishop restated questio
(117:17)
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Page/
Line
123:5

Objection
To introduction of

Grounds

By
~IDH

Relevancy and rrateriali ty

photographs

~

Sustained
Can rrak.e?

141:27

To Stauffer's testirrony
about purchase price

MOH Hearsay

144:25

To Stauffer's testirrony
about fences

wW

162:4

To rrore testirrony about
boundaries

WRB Curmllative

Sustained

165:13

To rrore testirrony about
who determined boundary

WRB Asked and answered

The answer
(165:17)

174:14

To introduction of
Exhibit 94

WRB Diagram inaccurate and
and therefore misleading

Overruled,
and misle4

178:16

To introduction of
Exhibit 93

WRB

Relevancy

Court rec
ruling

180:12

To Bishop's Arrended
Complaint & Reply

RWI'

Tirreliness (objection
Il\3.de at start of trial)

Bishop wit
to arrend.
to grant o
(180 :12)

195:4

To introduction of

WRB

Relevancy

Overruled

Repetitious

Sustained

Already answered

OverruJ.E:d

Overruled

Exhibit 93 (178:16)

'I

200:9

To Hughes' question
on f ann land

wW

205:16

To Thompson's questions
about contract

WRB Cross-examining witness

Overruled

205:27

To Thompson's questions
about contract

WRB

Overruled

215:11

To Thompson's question
about deposition

WRB

216:1

To Thompson's question
about deposition

WRB

Repetitious

Overruled

221:14

To Stauffer's testirrony
about residence in 1973

RWI'

Irrelevant, irrmaterial

It nay st<

~25:15

To Call's testirrony
about conversation

WRB

Unresponsive

It is stri

226:20

To Call's testirrony
about conversation

V.W

l.Jnresponsive

Repetitious

Overruled
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age/

~

§L

~ction

Grounds

Disp:>sition

To Thompson' s question
atout rreeting

WRB

28:3

Leading

Sustained (228:4)

~8:10

To call' s testirrony
atout rreeting

WRB

Unresp:msive

Court restated question

TO ca.ll' s testirrDny

WRB

Stating oonclusions

Sustained (228:13)

WRB

Leading

overruled (231:19)

To Call' s testi.'TOny
atout contract

wW

Conclusion

Stricken (234: 3)

p4:18 TO Call' s testirrony
atout conversation

ww

Who said what

It rriay stand (234:20)

:35:14 TO Call' s testirrony

l\IRB

Wants to know what they
asked

Thompson (235:17)

:Jl:ll

(228:14)

atout rreeting

:Jl:l7 To Thompson's question

atout neeting

,:J4:2

'

atout conversation

WRB

136:23 To Call ' s testirrony

3

atout farm ground

'b9:7

TO Thornpscn' s question

Question restated by
Question restated by

Thompson (236:25)
WRB

Leading

Sustained (239:8)

WRB

Leading and foundation

Sustained (245:4)

WRB

Foundation

Sustained (246:23)

l\IRB

Leadi...-1g

overruled (248:22)

WRB

Conclusion

overruled (250:19)

To Thompson' s question
al:x:Jut boundaries

WRB

Repetitious

OVerruled (253:14)

To Bishop' s question

RWI'

I=elevant; imraterial

overruled on cross

atout boundary
145:1

To Thornpscn' s question

atout f"nn ground
145:22 To Thornpson' s question

atout farm ground
148:14 To Thornpson' s question

al:x:Jut farm fence
150:18 To Thompson' s question

al:x:Jut agreerrent on farm
~53:12

~156:5

:~4:4

al:x:Jut residents

(256:8)

To Bishop's ouestion
al:x:Jut agre~nt

RWI'

•164:16 To Bishop's question

!~~7:20

RWI'

Wants to know when this
discussion occurred

Answer rray stand

After ti.Te lawsuit filed

overruled (264:18)

(264:8)

al::out agreerrent 8/15/73
Overruled (267:22)
RWI' Irreleva.'lt; imro.terial
'il:Dut sale Sponsored
to Sunset
Corp.
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Page/
Line

Objection

268:17

To Call's testirrony
al:out Sunset Corp. sale

269:22

To Bishop's question
al:out future tenefit

284:30

To introduction of any
evidence of Esplin
on rresne :::-ents

By
RWI'

Grounds
Foundation

Disr.r

~

AlloWed:::
Bishop :es·
(269 :29) '

WRB

Not in pleadings
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FOOTNOTES

1/ Child v. Child, 8 u. 2d 261, 268, 332 P.2d '.181 (1958).
2/ Finding of Fact No. 4, R. 259.
3/ Finding of Fact No.
7' R. 259.

4/ Finding of Fact No.
9' R. 260.
5/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261.
6/ That this might occur at least on one case when over 600
appeals are filed yearly is to be expected.

7/ Finding of Fact No. 13, R. 261.
8/

Finding of Fact No. 7' R. 260.

9/
See Justice Hall's opinion in Hidden Meadows Development
Company v. Dee Mills, et al., at p. 3, Nos. 15027, 15157, 15188,
filed January 2, 1979.

_!_QI See Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 U.2d 61 at 63, 362 P.2d 427
( 1961) where in the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated:
A condition precedent to the enforcement of any contract
is that there be a meeting of the minds of the parties,
which must be spelled out, either expressly or impliedly,
with sufficient definiteness to be enforced.
Under the
circumstances shown to exist here, where there was simply
some nebulous notion in the air that a contract might be
entered into in the future, the court cannot fabricate
the kind of a contract the parties ought to have made and
enforce it.
See also Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573, 18 S.Ct. 179, 42 L.Ed.
584 (1897); and 17 Am.Jur.2d "Contracts" §18.

11.I Defendants-respondents' Exhibits 15 and 93 are aerial
photographs of the property, while the plat map marked as Plaintiffs' Exhibit 19 represents the Calls' total ownership in graphic
form.

g;

The Court finds that Russell Call made several trips to
Utah each year between January 2, 1969, and the filing of this .
lawsuit in March of 1973 and that on several occasions boundaries
wer e d iscussed
·
'
·
but ~o subsequent
agreement, oral or otherwise,
was
ever reached that resolved the ambiguities. Finding of Fact No. 7.
13./

See Davison"· ~obbins,

30 Utah 2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026 (1973)
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1.il Petitioners are not unmindful that "tenor" has
legal de fini ti on.
In the evidentiary scheme, however, t~e':
of the word comports with its more conmonly accepted meamr.:

1:.21 E. Wayne Thode, "The Indefensible Use of the Hypot·
Case to Determine Cause in Fact," 146 Texas Law Review 42 ],
6
1 / See also, Carr v. Bradshaw Chevrolet Co., 23 Utah·
464 P.2d 580 (1970); and Singleton v. Alexander, 19 Utah2c'
431 P.2d 126 (1967).
.

121

See Appendix.

18/ Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 259, soi
538 ( 1973); State, by and through Road Commission, v. Larki:.
Utah 2d 395, 495 P.2d 817 (1972); Wagner v. Olsen, 25 Utaiii
482 p. 2d 702 ( 1970); In Re Ekker Is Estate' 19 Utah 2nd rn,'
485 (1967); Riter v. Cayias, 19 Utah 2d 358, 431P.2d788('.
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CERTIFIC~TE

OF SERVICE

I do hereby certify that on the
1979

~./-/,

day of February,

, I caused the foregoing BRIEF FOR PETITION ON REHEARING to be

served upon \Hllard R. Bishop, Esq., counsel for appellants, by

having two copies thereof delivered to his office at 172 North
Main street, Cedar City, Utah 84720.

M~¥
Attorney for Petitioners
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